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Case No. 20070918-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Davy Genaro Valenciano,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his conviction for distribution of a controlled substance, a
second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
In separate points, Defendant attacks the denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. Br.Aplt. at 1-3. The State combines its response into one:
Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion
to withdraw his guilty plea?
Standard ofReview: A denial of a motion to withdraw is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, ^ 11, 983 P.2d 556. The court's factual
findings are reviewed for clear error. Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
This appeal is governed by the constitutional standard embodied in UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008) (Addendum A):
A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily
made.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In October 2006, Defendant was charged with two counts of distribution of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a drug-free zone, first degree felonies,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2008), and one count
of possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (West Supp. 2008) (R. 1-4). The Public
Defender Association of Weber County [PDA] was appointed to represent
Defendant (R. 5-6).
Defendant declines appointment of PDA.
PDA appeared with Defendant at the preliminary hearing (R. 14-15). But
when Defendant announced he was hiring a private attorney, the hearing was
continued (id.). Defendant subsequently hired Ryan Bushnell to represent him (R.
14-16). Mr. Bushnell filed discovery requests and appeared at the re-scheduled
preliminary hearing (R. 18-22). The hearing was continued to the next day after the
magistrate (Judge Roger Dutson) recused himself (R. 21-22).

2

Defendant fires private attorney Bushnell.
The next day, Defendant appeared at the hearing without an attorney (R. 2324). Defendant told the magistrate (Judge Pamela Heffernan) that he had fired Mr.
Bushnell and had retained a new attorney, Roy Cole (id.). Prior to the hearing, Mr.
Cole had called the magistrate to confirm the representation and to request a
continuance, which was granted (id.). Cole filed an appearance of counsel, a request
for discovery, and a demand for a jury trial (R. 26-31). Bushnell withdrew (R. 32-33).
Defendant fires private attorney Cole.
Mr. Cole appeared with Defendant for preliminary hearing, but announced
that Defendant had fired him and hired another private attorney, Ian R. Vallejo (R.
35-36). The magistrate continued the hearing (id.). The same day, Mr. Vallejo filed
an appearance of counsel and requested discovery (R. 34). He also issued a
subpoena for records of the motel where the drug sale occurred (R. 51-53).
Defendant fires private attorney Vallejo
On February 12,2007, Mr. Vallejo appeared with Defendant for preliminary
hearing (R. 71-73). Vallejo was ready to proceed until, minutes before the hearing,
Defendant said he wanted to fire him (R. 71-73; R140:3). The magistrate questioned
Defendant, determined there was no actual conflict, and asked Mr. Vallejo "to
please represent" Defendant through preliminary hearing (R140: 3-7 & 58). Mr.
Vallejo agreed and Defendant did not object (R140: 7).
3

The preliminary hearing proceeded. The prosecution called Michael Bell and
Larry Nelson, who had already pled guilty in connection with this case, and three
members of the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force (R. 140). The magistrate
found probable cause to support the Information and bound Defendant over for
trial (R140:59-60). At the hearing's conclusion, the magistrate asked Defendant if he
still wanted to fire Mr. Vallejo. Defendant replied: "I don't - 1 ain't gonna say right
now. I don't have no idea right now. If I do not fire him or if I'm not" (R140: 61).
Two months later, Defendant fired Vallejo (R. 76-77).
Defendant accepts PDA.
After Mr. Vallejo was fired, Defendant accepted PDA's re-appointment (R. 7980). Trial was continued to July 2007 (R. 72 & 85). PDA attorney Michael Bouwhuis
received a transcript of the preliminary hearing and full discovery (R. 89; R140:2,4).
Defendant enters an Alford guilty plea to a reduced charge.
On July 10, 2007, two weeks before trial, Mr. Bouwhuis appeared with
Defendant for a final pretrial (R. 100-01). Bouwhuis said he had discussed the
prosecutor's plea offer with Defendant, but Defendant had rejected it (R141: 2).
Defense counsel explained that Defendant thought he was entitled to see all the
evidence against him "today" at pretrial (id.). Defense counsel felt an additional
discovery motion was unnecessary and unsupportable because all of the evidence
had already been disclosed (R141: 2 & 4). Defense counsel said he had "been over
4

it" with Defendant and the two had spent "lots of time" discussing the case (id.).
Defendant injected, "my other lawyer wasn't helping me at all" (R141: 3). The
judge, having witnessed the firings of Bushnell, Cole, and Vallejo, replied, "Well,
you've had complaints about all the lawyers you've h a d . . . So what's the problem
now?" (id.).
DEFENDANT: The first two didn't even show up for my first court date.
That's why I got rid of the first one. The second one didn't show up for
my first court date, so I got rid of him. And then I hired the third one.
That's - 1 only really - really got rid of one that I was really concerned
about. The other two didn't show up for court. Would you keep
them?
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bouwhuis is representing you. What's the
problem?
DEFENDANT: I hadn't said nothing about him.
THE COURT:

Well, so - what - what's -

DEFENDANT: I want to have all the evidence brought against me, but
they haven't.
THE COURT: You had a DEFENDANT: I think they don't have a case.
THE COURT: Mr. Valenciano, you had a prelim. You want your trial.
It's scheduled for the 25th, 26th, and 27th. Let's just confirm it right
now and we'll go to trial on those days. And you work with your
lawyer. If you want to see information that the State may have against
you, he - I'm sure that he can get that and you can confer with him on
it. But we're not going to be doing anything more in the open
courtroom other than having a trial in this case.
DEFENDANT: Can I get my motion for discovery?

5

THE COURT: Talk to your lawyer about it. He's - he's the one
representing you, so I don't -1 would assume the discovery's [sic] been
produced.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:

It has been.

(R141: 3-4). See Addendum B. The prosecutor added, "according to my records,
everything we have has been produced" (R141:4). The court asked defense counsel
if he would "make time" to answer Defendant's questions, to which counsel replied,
"I've made a lot of time available to him" (id.).
The court told Defendant that the pretrial was the last time he could plead to
a reduced charge; after that, no plea bargains would be allowed (R141: 4-5). The
court offered to pass the matter so that Defendant could discuss his concerns with
counsel, but explained that unless counsel asked for the case to be recalled, the court
would presume they were proceeding to trial as scheduled (R141: 5-6).
The case was passed, but later recalled when counsel announced that a plea
agreement had been reached: Defendant would enter an Alford guilty plea to a
reduced charge of second-degree drug distribution and the remaining charges
would be dismissed (R141: 7).1
1

An Alford plea permits a defendant to plead guilty, without admitting
culpability, to avoid conviction of a greater offense. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.
S. 25, 37 (1970) (requiring a "strong factual basis for the plea"). See also UTAH R.
CRIM. P. 11(e)(4)(B) (requiring "sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of
conviction"). Here, Defendant does not challenge the factual basis supporting his
plea. SeeBr.Aplt.SLt8 10-11.
6

The court conducted a colloquy with Defendant, fully informing him of his
rights pursuant to rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 Defense counsel
went over a written Statement in Advance of Plea "word by word" with Defendant
that day and twice previously in his office (R141: 9). The Statement was signed by
Defendant and incorporated into the record (id.). See Add. B. The prosecutor
proffered facts supporting the charges (R141: 16-17). The court found, based on
those facts, that there was a substantial likelihood that Defendant would be
convicted if he went to trial (R141:17).3
Throughout the colloquy, Defendant confirmed that he understood the rights
he was waiving by entering a guilty plea, that he was not under the influence of
alcohol or drugs, and that he was voluntarily choosing to plead guilty, even though
he disputed some facts and was not admitting culpability (R141: 7-17). The court
recognized that Defendant felt he was not guilty, but warned that the court was

2

Rule 11 "is designed to protect an individual's rights when entering a guilty
plea by ensuring that the defendant receives full notice of the charges, the elements,
how the defendant's conduct amount to a crime, [and] the consequences of the
plea[.]" State v. Bluemel, 2007 UT 90, % 17,173 P.3d 842 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Defendant concedes that the court complied with rule 11, but
claims the plea was not knowing and voluntary. See Br.Aplt. at 8 & 10-11.
Apart from the prosecutor's proffer, the judge was familiar with the
evidence supporting the charges because the judge presided over the preliminary
hearing and bound Defendant over for trial (R. 71-72). See State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d
666,674 (Utah App. 1993) (recognizing that the factual basis for a plea may include
the preliminary hearing evidence).
7

"going to be sentencing you as if you are, in fact, guilty of a second degree
felony" (R141:14-15). The court also warned that even if Defendant timely moved to
withdraw the plea, it was highly unlikely the court would allow it (R141: 13-14).
After Defendant said he understood, the court accepted the plea as knowing and
voluntary (R141:17). See Add. B.
Defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea.
Before sentencing, Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
alleging that he was under "duress" when he entered the plea (R. 111). In a
supporting affidavit, he alleged that: (1) his attorney "misled" him "regarding the
nature of the evidence;" (2) Defendant "did not get to see all the evidence;" (3) he
felt he was not guilty; and (4) he had been "continually harassed by one of the police
officers involved in the case" (R. 112-13).4 See Addendum C. Defense counsel
explained that Defendant believed that "there's a contradiction in the [police]
reports" regarding the motel room he rented (where the drug sale occurred) and
Defendant felt the alleged contradiction "should have been attacked" (R142:3). The
prosecutor argued that Defendant's generalized allegations lacked evidentiary
support and did not establish that the plea was not knowing or voluntary, as
required under section 77-13-6(2)(a) (R. 116-18). The court agreed. After reviewing
4

The affidavit also alleged that Defendant's wife "planted" the drugs found
on him, but the allegation was stuck-out by Defendant (R. 112).
8

a tape of the plea colloquy, the court concluded that the plea was knowing and
voluntary and that Defendant offered no valid reason for its withdrawal (R142:3-5).
See Addendum D.
On October 9, 2007, the court sentenced Defendant to one-to-fifteen years
imprisonment, to run concurrently with a sentence imposed in another case (R. 125).
Defendant timely appealed (R. 131).
STATEMENT OF FACTS5
Michael Bell had no idea that he had just sold $200.00 of methamphetamine to
an undercover police officer (R140:13,26). So when the undercover officer asked
Bell if he could get more methamphetamine, Bell readily agreed (id.). Within
minutes, Bell and a cohort, Larry Nelson, drove to Motel 6, where Nelson purchased
an ounce of methamphetamine from Defendant with money supplied by Bell (R140:
11-14,19-20). Bell, Nelson, and Defendant were immediately arrested (R140: 30).
* **

On October 27, 2006, Strike Force Undercover Agent Reid arranged to buy
methamphetamine from Michael Bell (R140: 25-26). Reid hoped to purchase
5

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the facts supporting his plea.
See note 1, supra. Nevertheless, the facts presented at preliminary hearing are
relevant to Defendant's claims that his plea should be vacated because he was
"confused" by the evidence and his counsel failed to adequately resolve this
confusion before he pled. See BrAplt. at 14-15 & 21. Defendant also contends that all
of his counsel failed to adequately discuss the facts with him and that if they had, he
would not have pled guilty. BrAplt. at 23.
9

$1000.00 (about an ounce) of methamphetamine (R140:26). Reid photographed the
Strike Force funds he would use for the purchase (R140: 26).
Reid met Bell to make the purchase, but Bell only had two hundred dollars'
worth of methamphetamine (R140: 25-26). Reid purchased the methamphetamine
with two of the photographed $100.00 bills and then asked Bell to get more
methamphetamine (id.). Bell agreed. Bell contacted Larry Nelson, who said he
could get "dope" from someone at Motel 6 (R140:11,13,16 & 18).
The Strike Force already had information that drugs were being sold from a
second floor room at Motel 6 (R140: 30-31 & 42). When it appeared that Bell and
Nelson were headed for the motel, surveillance was set up there.
Bell parked in the motel's parking lot. Because he did not know Nelson's
source, Bell planned to the lot while Nelson bought the drugs (R140:14, 26). Bell
gave Nelson $800.00, which included the $200.00 that Reid had just paid Bell (R140:
11,18-19).6 Nelson walked to the second floor and entered room 205 (R140:19,3334). Minutes later, Nelson exited room 205 with nearly one ounce, 27 grams, of
methamphetamine, which he gave to Bell (id.).
As Bell drove away with the methamphetamine, he was arrested (R140:11,27,
30). Bell admitted that Nelson had purchased the 27 grams for him so that Bell
6

Agent Reid did not advance money for the anticipated drug purchase, but
had paid $200.00 for the drugs Bell had already sold him (R140:11-13,26).
10

could sell it to Reid (R140; 11-13). Nelson was also arrested (R140:30,34,44-45). He
told the Strike Force that he had purchased 27 grams of methamphetamine from
"Davy" in room 205 and identified Davy's car in the parking lot (R140:19,36,45).
Meanwhile, officers maintained surveillance on room 205. Defendant exited
the room and drove away in the car Nelson had identified as Davy's (R140: 35).
Defendant was stopped and identified himself as Davy Valenciano (R140: 35-36).
He consented to a search of his car (R140: 37). A digital scale and "o" sheets were
found underneath the car's dashboard (R140: 37-38).7 Defendant was searched.
Two baggies of methamphetamine, weighing 3.9 ounces and 6.9 ounces, were in his
pants pocket (R140: 38-40,46-48). A wad of cash was hidden up his pant leg. The
cash, totaling $2100.00, included the two $100.00 bills Agent Reid gave Bell and Bell
gave Nelson (R140: 40-41,46-48).
Rooms 205 and 206 were searched pursuant to warrant (R140:50). The rooms
were connected by an interior door, which was unlocked and open, allowing free
access between the two rooms (id.). A rental receipt for room 206 was in
Defendant's name (id.). A glass methamphetamine pipe, which Defendant admitted
was his, was found in room 206 (R140: 50-51).

7

A digital scale is commonly used to weigh narcotics (R140: 37-38). "O"
sheets are basically drug sale ledgers, listing drug purchasers and the amounts they
owe the dealer (R140: 38).
11

Bell and Nelson pled guilty to felony drug charges and were called as
prosecution witnesses at Defendant's preliminary hearing (R140: 11, 17-18). Bell
fully testified (R140:10-16). Nelson, who had not yet been sentenced, testified in
part - admitting that he purchased methamphetamine in room 205 and that
Defendant ("Davy") was in the room - but invoking the Fifth Amendment when
asked if he had arranged the sale directly with Defendant (R140: 21). Three
members of the Strike Force, including Agent Reid, also testified at the hearing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Utah, a guilty plea may be withdrawn only if it is not knowing and
voluntary. A guilty plea is presumed to be knowing and voluntary if it is entered in
compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. But the converse is not
true— non-compliance with rule 11 does not demonstrate that a plea was not
knowing and voluntary.
Here, Defendant concedes that his plea is presumed valid. See Br.Aplt. at 8 &
10-11. Nevertheless, he contends it is not knowing and voluntary because (1) he was
confused concerning the evidence against him and (2) his counsel failed to
adequately explain the evidence to him and pressured him into pleading. Defendant
asserts that if his counsel had adequately discussed the facts with him, he would not
have pled guilty.

12

The merits of Defendant's claims should not be considered because he fails to
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw.
Moreover, some of his arguments are not preserved. Alternatively, if the merits are
considered, the record supports the trial court's ruling.
Defendant heard the evidence against him at preliminary hearing and,
through counsel, received full discovery. The evidence was not complicated. Bell
unwittingly agreed to sell methamphetamine to an undercover officer. Bell used
Nelson as a middleman. Nelson purchased the methamphetamine from Defendant
and then gave the drugs to Bell. Bell was arrested with the drugs and Defendant
was arrested with the money and other items evidencing drug dealing. Though
Defendant believed there was a discrepancy concerning which motel room he
rented, he discussed the matter with counsel and then knowingly and voluntarily
chose to plead guilty to a reduced charge to avoid conviction on greater offenses.
In denying the motion to withdraw, the trial court reviewed the plea colloquy
hearing. The court correctly found nothing to support that the plea was not
knowing or voluntary. Consequently, there was no basis to vacate the plea.

13

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY
GUILTY PLEA
In 2003, Utah narrowed the basis upon which a guilty plea may be
withdrawn. Whereas before, a plea could be withdrawn for "good cause," Utah law
now permits a guilty plea to be withdrawn only upon "a showing that it was not
knowingly and voluntarily entered." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (West Supp. 2008).
This is a constitutional standard. Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993)
(recognizing that whether a plea is knowing and voluntary is a constitutional
determination). This constitutional standard, unlike the former "good cause"
standard, does not require that a guilty plea strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Compare Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992 (holding that "a failure to
comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty plea does not" render a plea
unknowing or involuntary), with State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App.
1994) (applying pre-2003 law and holding that a failure to comply with rule 11
constitutes "good cause" to withdraw a plea). Nevertheless, when a guilty plea is
entered in compliance with rule 11, the plea is presumed to be knowing and
voluntary. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ^ 22,26 P.3d 203; State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT
44,111,1 P.3d 1108.

14

Here, Defendant acknowledges his heavy burden in establishing that his plea
was not knowing and voluntary. He concedes that the trial court fully complied
with rule 11 in accepting his plea and, therefore, the plea is presumed valid. Br.Aplt
at 10-11. Nevertheless, Defendant contends that his plea is not knowing and
voluntary because he was confused and his counsel was ineffective. Br.Aplt at 14-16
& 21-23. Consequently, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
not permitting the plea's withdrawal. Br.Aplt at 2 & 23.
Defendant's claim has narrowed over time. In the trial court, Defendant filed
a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming the plea was entered under
"duress" (R. 111). He further alleged that: (1) his attorney "misled" him concerning
the evidence; (2) Defendant did not personally see all the evidence; (3) he felt he was
not guilty; and (4) he was "continually harassed by one of the police officers involve
in the case" (R. 112-13). See Add. C. Defense counsel explained that Defendant
believed there was a "contradiction" in the police reports about which room he
rented and that the rental receipt for room 206 was not signed by him (R. 142: 2-3).
But as Defendant admits on appeal, he presented no evidence and proffered no facts
to support these allegations. Br.Aplt. at 9. The trial court found that the allegations
established no basis to set aside the plea (R142: 3-5).
On appeal, Defendant abandons some of his allegations and modifies others.
He no longer claims that his plea should be vacated because he is not guilty or
15

because of the claimed police harassment. Instead, he asserts that when he pled, he
was confused by the evidence and his counsel pressured him into pleading without
resolving the confusion. BrAplt. at 14-16 & 21-23. He contends that he could not
"intelligently" elect to plead because he did not "understand" the evidence against
him. BrAplt at 11.
The Court should not consider the merits of Defendant's claims because he
fails to marshal the evidence that supports the trial court's ruling. See State
v.Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, f 13, 983 P.3d 536; State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App
191, t 20,186 P.3d 1023. Although Defendant candidly admits that his motion to
withdraw was not supported by legal memorandum or evidentiary facts, BrAplt. at
9, he fails to marshal "every scrap of competent evidence" that supports the trial
court's ruling and contradicts his assertions. See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191,
\ 20. Compare Defendant's Statement of the Case & Statement of Facts, BrAplt at 710, with the State's Statement of the Case & Statement of Facts, supra. The Court,
therefore, may summarily reject his claims. See Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, ^[ 13; ChavezEspinoza, 2008 UT App 191, f 20. Additionally, the Court should decline to consider
the merits of claims Defendant raises for the first time on appeal. See ChavezEspinoza, 2008 UT App 191, f 7. Alternatively, even if the merits are considered, the
record negates Defendant's allegations and supports the trial court's ruling.

16

A. Defendant's claim that he was confused when he entered his plea
lacks merit.
Defendant claims that his "confusion" at the time of the plea was evident
because, earlier in the final pretrial hearing, he voiced his desire for additional
discovery. Br. Aplt at 13. The claim lacks merit.
Defendant initially discovered the evidence against him during the
preliminary hearing, where two co-defendants and three Strike Force officers
testified concerning the October 27th drug dealings. See Statement of Facts, supra.
Additionally, the prosecutor complied with the discovery requests filed by
Defendant's various counsel and, by the final pretrial, had disclosed all of the State's
evidence (R141: 4). Defense counsel thoroughly discussed this evidence with
Defendant on multiple occasions before Defendant entered his plea (R141: 2-4).
Indeed, despite Defendant's claim that his counsel did not discuss the evidence with
him, Br.Aplt at 13-15, Defendant was sufficiently familiar with the police reports
and physical evidence that he could claim that a "contradiction" existed in the
reports about which room he rented and that the rental receipt for room 206 did not
include his signature (R142: 3).8
At the time of the plea, Defendant expressed no dissatisfaction with Mr.
Bouwhuis's representation (R141:2-3). Consequently, when it became apparent that
8

The State does not concede Defendant's allegations are true, but only that he
asserted them.
17

Defendant was passing up his last opportunity to plea to a reduced charge that
would reduce two potential life sentences to one fifteen-year sentence, the Court
wisely allowed Defendant additional time to discuss the offer with his counsel
(R141:6). See Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, f 17 (recognizing that it is appropriate to allow
a defendant additional time to consider a plea).
Following this interlude, Defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered an
Alford guilty plea. As the trial court found, Defendant evidenced no confusion in
entering the plea: Defendant "knew what [he was] doing" (R142: 4). The record
supports this finding. During the colloquy, Defendant clearly stated that he
understood that a guilty plea would waive his rights to challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence, to confront the prosecution witnesses, and to present his own evidence
(R141:10-11). Add. B. Following the prosecutor's proffer of the factual basis for the
charges, the court told Defendant that even though he was not admitting these facts,
the court was accepting them as true (R141:14-15,16-17). Throughout the colloquy,
Defendant consistently evidenced his understanding of the implications of his plea
and never voiced confusion or hesitation in entering it (R141:7-17). See Add. B. This
record refutes Defendant's claim that his earlier confusion regarding discovery
undercut the knowing and voluntary nature of his subsequent plea. See Benvenuto,
1999 UT 60, t1f 17-18 & 22 (holding that vacillation and hesitancy leading up to a
plea does not necessarily render the plea unknowing or involuntary).
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Defendant also raises new unpreserved claims on appeal, the merits of which
should not be considered. See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, % 7. Defendant
claims for the first time on appeal that he thought if he entered an Alford plea, he
could review the evidence and withdraw his plea before sentencing. See BrAplt at
14-15. It is true that a defendant who pleads guilty may move to withdraw the plea
before he is sentenced. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(1) (Add. A). But Defendant
claims more than this: he claims he thought an Alford plea entitled him to withdraw
his plea. Cf. BrAplt. at 14-15. The court clearly informed him otherwise. The court
warned Defendant that it was unlikely that a motion to withdraw would be
granted, even if timely filed, and that his Alford plea would be treated as any other
guilty plea in sentencing (R141:13-14).
Defendant also contends for the first time that he did not "understand the
nature and value of any promises made to him/' See BrAplt at 16. But Defendant
fails to explain what promise he misunderstood or did not receive. The record
establishes that only one promise was made to Defendant: the prosecution would
reduce one first-degree felony to a second-degree felony and would dismiss the
other charges (R141: 7-10). This promise was kept (id.).
In sum, the trial court properly rejected Defendant's vague and unsupported
claim that he was "confused" at the time he entered the plea (R142: 3-5).

19

B. Defendant's claims that his attorney failed to adequately consult
with him and unduly pressured him into pleading guilty lack
merit.
Below, Defendant complained repeatedly that his first two counsel, Mr.
Bushnell and Mr. Cole, failed to appear at hearings and that Mr. Vallejo was "a
concern." See Statement of the Case, supra. He repeated these claims during the final
pretrial, but not during the plea colloquy (R141:2-3). Defendant stated that his prior
counsel did not "help" him, but raised no complaint about Mr. Bouwhuis, who then
represented him (id.).
In moving to withdraw his plea, Defendant alleged for the first time that he
was "misled by my attorney concerning the evidence against me" (R. 112). He did
not, however, specify which attorney he was referring to or how he was misled. The
court did not specifically address the issue, other than to agree with the prosecutor
that all of Defendant's claims were vague and unsupported and did not undermine
the knowing or voluntary nature of the plea (R. 116-18; R142: 3-5).
Defendant impermissibly expands this argument for the first time on appeal.
See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, ^ 7. He now contends that Mr. Bouwhuis
was ineffective because he pressured Defendant to plead guilty without addressing
or resolving Defendant's confusion over discovery. See Br.Aplt at 21. He also
claims for the first time that Mr. Bouwhuis and his former counsel failed to provide
him with discovery materials or discuss the evidence with him and that if they had,
20

he would not have pled guilty. See Br.Aplt at 21-23. The merits of these new claims
should not be considered. See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, f 7. In any case,
the record does not support Defendant's allegations.
To establish ineffectiveness of counsel, Defendant must demonstrate that his
counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell "below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment" and "'that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Martinez, 2001 UT
12, f1f 16-17 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In the
context of a guilty plea, this requires Defendant to establish that "but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
Id. at 1f 17 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Ultimately, however,
"ineffectiveness of counsel that contributes to a flawed guilty plea . . . can spare a
defendant the consequences of [his] plea only if the defendant makes out the same
case required of every defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea: that the plea was
not knowing and voluntary." State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, If 13,167 P.3d 1046.
As the trial court noted during the final pretrial, Defendant regularly
complained of and fired his attorneys (R141: 3). See also Statement of Case, supra.
Defendant falsely claimed that his first two attorneys, Mr. Bushnell and Mr. Cole,
failed to appear for hearings (R141: 2-3). But see Statement of the Case, supra. He
suggested that Mr. Vallejo was a "concern" based on his performance on the
21

preliminary hearing (R141: 2-3). But see R140 (demonstrating Vallejo's effective
representation at preliminary hearing). Yet, when Defendant moved to withdraw
his plea, he did not raise these complaints as a ground to withdraw the plea.
Instead, he claimed he "was misled by my attorney" concerning the evidence
against him (R. 112-13). In the trial court, even Defendant recognized that his
complaints with former counsel had no bearing on his guilty plea, because these
attorneys did not represent Defendant when he pled. Defendant's contrary claim on
appeal - that his former counsel's performances infected his guilty plea - should be
summarily rejected as unpreserved and without merit.
On the other hand, Mr. Bouwhuis represented Defendant when the plea was
entered and for the three months leading up to the plea (R. 79-80 & 100-01). Mr.
Bouwhuis reviewed the preliminary hearing evidence and all discovery materials
and then spent "a lot" of time discussing the case with Defendant (R141:2-4). Twice
before the final pretrial, Bouwhuis discussed the plea offer with Defendant, and
explained the rights Defendant would be waiving if he pled (R141:8-9). On the last
day a plea bargain was possible, Bouwhuis again discussed the reduced plea offer
with Defendant and again explained "word by word" the rights Defendant would
be waiving if he pled (id.).
Despite this record, Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that Mr.
Bouwhuis provided ineffective assistance of counsel in that he failed to adequately
22

discuss the evidence with Defendant, failed to clarify Defendant's "confusion"
before he pled, and unduly pressured Defendant into a "speedy" plea. BrAplt at 15
& 21. Because the issue was not preserved, its merits should not be considered. See
Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, \ 7. In any case, the record belies the claim. See
facts discussed, supra. See also Statement of the Case, supra.
The only preserved claim regarding Mr. Bouwhuis is the one raised in
Defendant's pro se motion to withdraw where Defendant claimed "his attorney"
misled him. Though the allegation was not specific, Mr. Bouwhuis interpreted it to
mean that he should have attacked the "contradiction" Defendant alleged
concerning which motel room he rented (R142: 3). During the hearing on the
motion to withdraw, Defendant did not dispute Mr. Bouwhuis's interpretation of
his claim (id.)
The facts establish no ineffectiveness. Even assuming arguendo that an
"evidentiary conflict" existed, attacking it would have been of no avail. At the
preliminary hearing, Nelson admitted that he went to room 205 to buy
methamphetamine and that Defendant was in the room when he bought the drugs.
See Statement of Facts, supra. When asked if he arranged the sale with Defendant,
Nelson invoked the Fifth Amendment (R140: 21). An officer testified that when
Nelson was arrested, he admitted that he arranged the sale with Davy and
identified Davy's car (R140: 45). Surveillance officers saw Defendant, known as
23

"Davy/7 exit room 205 after the sale and drive away in the car identified by Nelson.
When stopped, Defendant had hidden on him the money from the drug sale plus
ten ounces of methamphetamine; a digital scale and "o" sheets were hidden in his
car. See Statement of Facts, supra. A subsequent search of the motel established that
rooms 205 and 206 were connected by an adjoining door and that Defendant left a
glass methamphetamine pipe in room 206. See id. In sum, it makes no difference
which motel room, if any, was rented to Defendant.
Defendant fails to establish that Mr. Bouwhuis's representation undermined
the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea. Consequently, the trial court
properly found no basis to grant the motion to withdraw.
CONCLUSION
The denial of Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted September^^2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addenda

Addendum A

Addendum A

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in
abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be
announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in Abeyance, a motion to withdraw
the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection
(2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and
Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Laws 1980, c 15, § 2; Laws 1989, c 65, § 1; Laws 1994, c 16, § 1; Laws 2003, c 290, § 1, eff. May 5,
2003; Laws 2004, c. 90, § 91, eff. May 3,2004; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 251, eft Feb. 7,2008.
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Defendant's letter

CD19800223

061904066

Daaes.

VALENCIANO.DAVYGENARO

Ut

D. BOUWHUIS (# 6498)

MICHAEL

SECOND DISTRICT COURT

PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC.,

2007AU6-9 PH 3^32

OF WEBER COUNTY

Attorneys for Defendant
2562 Washington Boulevard
Osden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 392-8247

MO 1 0 2007

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

I

AFFIDAVIT OF D A W

I

VALENCIANO

1

CASE No. 061904066

|

JUDGE PAMEIAHEFFERNAN

vs.
D A W VALENCIANO,

Defendant.

State of Utah

)
:S.S.

County of Weber

)

Davy Genaro Valenciano, beins first and duly sworn, upon his oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

On July 10, 2007,1 entered an Alford Plea of Guilty to a Distribution of a Controlled
Substance, a second degree felony.

2.

On July 17,2007,1 spoke with my Attorney, Michael Bouwhuis, and notified him that
I would like to have my plea withdrawn based on the following reason(s):
a.

I feel that I was misled regarding the nature of the evidence against me.

b.

I did not get to see all the evidence against me.

c.

I feel that I am not guilty.

d.

^Ay^wfepldl iled U \<d diugs oi u i KB

FIDAVIT OF DAVY VALENCIANO

CD19764467

pages:

STATE OF UTAH VS DAVY VALENCIANU
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVY GENARO VALENCIANO
Case No. 061904066

e.

I have been continually harassed by one of the police officers involved in the
case.

DATED

this 8 day of Ausust, of 2007.
'#*%/^
DAWVAKNCIANO
AFFIANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to

before me this

*ft

day of Ausust, of 2007.

MATTHEW MAIER
Notary Public
Residins in Weber County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

*0U*YHBLK-$T*TE0F(m
721W12TH STRICT
OGOEN.UT 84404

COMM. EXP. 04*05.2011

2
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Addendum C

Addendum C

THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC.,
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2081 JUL 10 P U 0 8

2562 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone:(801) 392-8247
Fax:(801)334-7275

SECOND DISTRICT COURT

JUL 1 0 2007
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

STATE OF UTAH,

IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA

Plaintiff,

AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Case No.

vs.

-kg vj

l/tt/f/f

0bl^64^(o(o

c / V fi fr
JUDGE

Defendant.

/ w ^ ?*V>*«74?

j hereby acknowledge and certify that

I,

have been advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights;

NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES

am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
CRIMES* STATUTORY

DEGREE

PROVISION

A

P/p-h^U/fr^,

&F

—-

B.
C.
D.

md c«

CD19713088

061904066

PUNISHMENT
MIN/AAAX AND/OR

paqes.

VALENCIANO,DAVYGENARO

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading
guilty (or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:

I understand that by pleading guilty, I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing
crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that
the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am
criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the Court to accept my guilty (or no contest)
pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest):

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the
constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest)
I will give up all the following rights:

COUNSEL: I know

that I have the risht to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot

afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I understand that I
misht later, if the Judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed
lawyer's service to me.
I have not waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have done
so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reason.-

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or
no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is /^^t/<^J^€£^

/ ^ r

.

My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my
guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
JuRy TRIAL. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased)
jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. I know

that if I were to have a jury

trial, (a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and
(b) by my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
RIGHT TO COMPEL WITNESSES. I know

that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I

choose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of
the witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay
those costs.
RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.

I know that if I were to have a jury

trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I choose not to testify,
no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that if I
choose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against
me.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF. I know

that if I do not plead guilty (or no

contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s) If
I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty" and my case will be set
for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s)
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning
that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
APPEAL. I know

that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I

would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.

CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA
POTENTIAL PENALTIES. I know

the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime

to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no contest) to a
crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty
for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed.
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS. I know

that if there is more than one crime involved,

the sentence may be imposed one after the other (consecutively), or they may run at the same
time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead
to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of
which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no

contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences beins imposed on me. If the offense
to which I am now pleadins guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the Court finds and states on the
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.
PLEA BARGAIN:

My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are not) the result of a plea bargain

between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties and provisions of the plea
bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:

£x^z^Q f/j^j}^77z±fi r*fy>\s€*£
- ^

^
*^^*-Tsf./?
gs/P<M*.

6^<Z»

*-

TRIAL JUDGE NOT BOUND.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or

recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe
the Judge may do are not binding on the Judge.

DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS

I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats ox unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attomey, and I understand
its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney
I am 3 3 years of age I have attended school through the / /

Grade I can read

and understand the English Language If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which
would impair my judgement when I decided to plead guilty I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medications or intoxicants which impair my judgement
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) prior to sentencing I will be allowed to withdraw my
plea only if I show good cause Once I am sentenced, I lose my right to withdraw my plea
DATED this

/ Q day of _

,20^*7

'DEFENDANT

/

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for

, the defendant

above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her, I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents
and is mentally and physically competent To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an
appropriate investigation, the elements of the cnme(s) and the factual synopsis of the
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated, and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate
and true

TORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
BAR NO

<S < ^ P p

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

,

certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case asainst
, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of defendant and find that the
factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and
correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourase a plea has been offered
defendant. The plea nesotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea
Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to
believe that the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the offense(s) for
which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) is/are entered and that
the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

ORDER

Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in Court, the Court witnesses the
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly and
voluntarily made.
It is hereby ordered that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the crime(s) set
forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this

day of
/

* no
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

State of Utah versus Davy Valenciano,

61904066.
Go ahead, Mr. Bouwhuis.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
pretrial.

Your Honor, this is the time set for

This is scheduled for a jury trial later this

month.
Just for the Court's information, there has been an
offer made and relayed to Mr. Valenciano.
that.

He —

He's rejected

I think the Court's very familiar with him.

I

read the preliminary hearing transcript.
He asked me —
request.

and I told him I would not make this

He wants to request that all the evidence against

him be shown here today.
held in the case.
THE COURT:

There was a preliminary hearing

We've been over it.
Yeah.

I don't quite understand where

you're coming from with that request because you've got a
lawyer.

I assume that you —

that he could do the discovery,

go through the discovery process, obtain information the
State may have that may, you know, prove that you're guilty,
which you're entitled to.
But we had the prelim, and beyond that, nothing is
required to happen in this courtroom other than a trial.
THE DEFENDANT:

Well, I'm not familiar with the

court system at all, but I feel my other lawyer wasn't

Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS
(801) 395-1055

2

I helping me aib all.
THE COURT:

Well, you've had complaints about all

1 the lawyers you've had now -THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
know.

1
1

So what's the pr<Dblem now?

for my first court date

The first two didn't even show up
That's why I got rid of the first

The second one didn't show up fo.r my first court date, 1

so I got rid of him.
That' s —

And then I hired the third one.

I only really —

really concerned about.
court

— the first —

-- so I don't qui te understand, you

THE DEFENDANT:

one.

The first

I

really got .rid of one that I was
The other two didn't show up for

1
J

Would you keep 1bhem?
THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Bouwhuis is representing you. 1

What' s the problem?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I hadn't said nothing about him.
what —

Well, so —

THE DEFENDANT:

1

what's —

J

I want to have all the evidence

1

1 brought against me, but they haven't.
THE COURT:

You had a

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
1 want your trial.
27th .

—

I think they don't have a case.

Mr . Valenciano, you had a prelim.

J
You

It's scheduled for the 25th, 26th, and

1

Let's just confirm it right now and we'll go to trial

1 on those day s.
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And you work with your lawyer.

If you want to see

information that the State may have against you, he —

I'm

sure that he can get that and you can confer with him on it.
But we're not going to be doing anything more in the open
courtroom other than having a trial in this case.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Can I get my motion for discovery?

Talk to your lawyer about it.

he's the one representing you, so I don't —

He's

—

I would assume

the discovery's been produced.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
MS. CORP:

It has been.

Your Honor, I have produced —

well, this

file wasn't mine originally, but according to my records,
everything we have has been produced.

If there's something

specific that they feel is missing, I'll be glad to have
Mr. Bouwhuis look at my file and talk to the police officers.
There's nothing that we're trying to hide from the defendant.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And you need —

your obligation

in this is to keep in touch with your lawyer to ask him the
questions that you want answered.
And I'd ask, Mr. Bouwhuis, that you just make time
available for him to answer his questions and
MR. BOUWHUIS:

—

I've made a lot of time available for

him.
THE COURT:

But just so that you also know, this is

the last court date before your trial, so today is the last
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day to consider any kind of a plea negotiation.

After today,

I will not accept a plea to less than what's charged or a
complete dismissal by the State.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
trial.

I —

very reason.

I can't have another date?

I don't have another date before your

this is the day we set for the pretrial for that
So this- is the day to decide, either you want

to do that or we confirm the trial and go ahead with the
trial, absent the State moving to dismiss the case for some
reason.
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Well, just for Your Honor's

information, he was considering whether or not he wanted to
have a bench trial or a jury trial.

I told him he would need

to make that decision here.
THE COURT:

There —

there was a request made for a

jury trial, so it's on the docket as a jury trial.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I didn't ask for it.

Well, it —

it's —

in a case like this,

Mr. Valenciano, it's normally assumed that you -- you'd be
getting a jury trial.

You know, you certainly can have a

right to waive that right, but that would have to be done
after careful consideration with your lawyer on that.
I'd —
trial.

And

I'd need to take a full waiver of your right to a jury
These are two first degree felonies.

They have

serious consequences if you're convicted.
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So, you know, it's important that you make those
decisions seriously and after consulting with your lawyer
about it.
If you want, I can pass it and you can discuss it
with him and see if —

put it back on later and see if he's

interested in taking any kind of negotiated offer.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
back

Let's pass it, if we may, and come

—
THE COURT:

Okay.

If you want me to recall it

—

otherwise, I'm assuming that it's going to go ahead just as
we've scheduled it

—

MR. BOUWHUIS:

Okay.

So we just recall it today if

he's changed his mind.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

If you've got something else you

need to talk to me about.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Otherwise

—

MR. BOUWHUIS:

All right.

THE COURT:

otherwise I'm going to assume it will

—

Thank you.

go as a jury trial.
(Break in proceedings on this case.)
MR. BOUWHUIS:
Valenciano.

Your Honor, we can recall Davy

It's number 12.

THE COURT:
reporter case.

Recall Davy Valenciano.

This is a court

61904066.
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MR. BOUWHUIS:

We won't actually need a reporter for

this.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BOUWHUIS:
resolution on this case.

Your Honor, we've reached a
The State has agreed to amend

Count 1 to a second degree felony and dismiss the remaining
counts.

He'll enter an Alford plea to Count 1 as amended.
MS. CORP:

Your Honor, if we could do the reduction

by striking the language that it was in a drug-free zone.

It

would be a simple distribution.
THE COURT:

All right.

What I'm going to do is read

to you the elements of the offense that you're admitting to
by entering a plea of guilty.

I'll just take it and then ask

questions.
Had you gone to trial on the charge as amended, the
State would have to prove the following elements beyond a
reasonable doubt before you could be convicted of anything.
They would specifically have to prove that you
distributed or arranged to distribute a controlled substance,
a second degree felony.
They would have to prove that you knowingly and
intentionally distributed a controlled or counterfeit
substance, or agreed, consented, offered, or arranged to
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; to wit,
methamphetamine.
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They've asked that the enhancement language that it
was in a drug-free zone be stricken.

That makes it a second

degree felony.
Do you understand the elements?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Okay.

because there seems —

I'm —

I'm concerned a little bit

along, throughout this case, there've

oftentimes been some misunderstandings I think, at least
misunderstandings to the point where I've got some concern
and I want to make sure that you know what you're doing today
and this is, in fact, what you do want to do.
Do you understand what's going on?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Yeah.

Okay.

And I read to you the elements.

Do you understand the charge as amended?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Do you understand it?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT;

(No response.)

Yes.

That's what the State would have to

prove had you gone to trial.

They'd have to prove that

beyond a reasonable doubt.
Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.
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THE COURT:
the guilty plea?

Did you read the statement in support of

That document in front of you.

MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

I read it to him word for word.

Thank you, Mr. Bouwhuis.

And when that was read to you, did you understand
what was read?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Do you have any questions at all?

THE DEFENDANT:
MR. BOUWHUIS:

No.
For the record, Your Honor, I've

also, in addition to meeting with him here today, met with
him two other times in my office to discuss this case.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Because of the —

kind of the

ongoing problems that we've had, you know, in terms of
communication, if you will, I just want to make sure all the
rights are gone through clearly.
It -- it T s an offense that carries 1 to 15 years at
the Utah State Prison.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Right now I don't know a lot about what

happened here in this case.
report.

But there is a pos —

I'm going to get a presentence
a distinct possibility you

could serve time at the Utah State Prison if you plead
guilty.
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Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

And you could serve the 1 to 15 years,

and up to $10,000 in fines.
Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Okay.

Did you, in fact, sign the

document, the Statement in Support of a Guilty Plea?

This

document.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Okay.

And I'll make it part of the

record based on the representations that you've given me that
you read and —

that it was read to you and that you

understood it.

And I'm relying on that to make a part of the

record to support your plea.
You have a right against compulsory
self-incrimination.

That means you don't have to say

anything that would incriminate you.
don't have to plead guilty.

In other words, you

That would be incriminating

yourself.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Okay.

Instead of pleading guilty, you

have a right to a speedy public trial before an impartial
jury, and at your trial you're presumed innocent of all the
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charges.
You have a right to bring in witnesses by subpoena.
If you couldn't afford to pay the costs of that, to bring in
witnesses into court, the State would have to pay for that.
At your trial you have a right to be present in the
same room when the witnesses testify against you.
And you have a right to assist your attorney in
cross-examining and challenging those witnesses that are
brought in against you at trial.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Okay.

You have a constitutional right

not to testify at your trial.

If you exercise that right, no

one can assume you're guilty or assume anything negative
about you as a result of that.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

However, if you plead guilty, you're

giving up your right against self-incrimination and a right
to simply remain silent and make the State prove the case.
Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

I've told you what you're charged with;

I've told you what the potential penalties are.

Do you

understand those could be imposed?
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THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Has anybody promised you anything

different than that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No.

Okay.

The only thing that's been

promised by the State is that they would reduce it to a
second degree felony in exchange for a guilty plea.
understand that's the only —

only thing that's —

Do you
that

—

the only guarantee here?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Okay.

I haven't decided what the

sentence would be, and since I'm the one that decides what
the sentence will be, no one could tell you what the sentence
will be.

In other words, no one can read my mind.

And I

haven't decided it yet, so I can't even tell you what the
sentence would be.
So no one —

if anybody's made any representations

about what they think the sentence would be or what it could
be, you shouldn't rely on that in making your decision to
plead guilty because you could have the maximum sentence
imposed.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Has anybody made any other promises to

you?
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THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
Mr. Valenciano.

No.

You've talked with —

Mr. Bouwhuis, with

Do you feel that he understands what's going

on?
MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

I do, Your Honor.

And do you feel he's doing this

voluntarily?
MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

I do.

Okay.

Regarding sentencing, I'll listen

to the recommendations that are made, I'll listen to what the
State says, I'll read a presentence report and listen to
AP&P's recommendations, and as well as the recommendations
your own attorney will make, as well as the statement by you.
But as I said, I'm not bound to follow anyone's
recommendations regarding what the sentence would be.
I'll also advise you that in order for you to
withdraw your guilty plea, you must file a motion to withdraw
your guilty plea before you are sentenced, otherwise it will
not be considered by this Court at this time.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

However, since we're going through this

in such great detail and I'm asking you all these questions
about whether you understand it or not, it would be highly
unlikely that I would let you withdraw your guilty plea, so
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1

I today's a good day to think very, very seriously about

2

J whether this is, in fact, what you want to do.

3

I you move to withdraw your plea later on and you can't show me

4

I that anything was done that was wrong, I'm probably not going

5

I to let you withdraw it anyway, even if you filed a motion.

6

I

Do you understand all that?

7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. BOUWHUIS:

10

I indicated this.

11

Because if

Yes.

Okay.
Your Honor, I don't know if I

This is going to be an Alford plea.

THE COURT:

Yeah.

12

I

MR. BOUWHUIS:

13

I

THE COURT:

14

I Even if you feel you're not guilty, but don't want to go

15

I through the risk of trial, and you're willing to enter a

16

I guilty plea to something less, you will be sentenced as if

17

I you are, in fact, guilty.

18

J

19

I guilty, but I'm really not guilty, I'm doing it to avoid the

20

I risk of conviction, it would not be appropriate for you to

21

I come on the date of sentencing and say to me, but I'm really

22

I not guilty so don't sentence me.

23

I sentencing you as if you are, in fact, guilty of a second

24

I degree felony.

25

Did I —

Okay.

okay.

I mentioned that.

Let me just reiterate that then.

Do you understand that?

In other words, if you say I'm going to plead

Because I'm going to be

Do you understand all that?
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THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
you're sentenced —

Yes.

Okay.

You have 30 days from the date

which finalizes your conviction —

to

file an appeal, but you must file it within 30 days from the
date of appeal -- I mean the date of conviction.

And you are

limited after you've pled guilty by what you can —

by what

you can appeal.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Has anybody promised you anything in

exchange for pleading guilty?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No.

Are you doing this of your own free will

and choice?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

And are you under the influence of

anything that would affect your judgment?

Alcohol, drugs, or

anything?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No.

And are you supposed to be taking any

kind of prescription drugs or any other kind of drugs that
would affect your judgment today that you're not taking
today?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No.

Okay.

Do you have any questions that
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have come to mind that you want to ask either me or
Mr. Bouwhuis before we proceed?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No.

Okay.

And have you understood

everything today I?ve told you regarding your rights?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

All right.

Can I get a factual basis,

please?
MS. CORP:

Yes, Your Honor.

On October 27th of

2006, Strike Force agents executed a controlled buy at the
Motel 6.

The room that they sent an undercover agent to

purchase methamphetamine was rented to the defendant.
The agent used money that had been marked by the
Strike Force so that it could be later identified.

Then

based on that controlled purchase, they obtained a search
warrant.
They went back to the motel room to conduct the
search and discovered the defendant leaving in a car from
that location.

He was stopped.

He consented to a search of

his vehicle.
They found evidence, including sheets of paper that
they're describing as owe sheets, indicating amounts that had
been sold and —

amounts of drugs that had been sold and

amounts that they had been sold for.

And some other

paraphernalia.
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Based on that, the defendant was arrested and he was
searched.

In his jacket was found two baggies of

methamphetamine, one weighing 3.9 grams, the other weighing
6.9 grams.
The officer who searched his jacket reached down,
pulled up his pant leg and out fell a wad of money that
totaled $1,951.

A portion of that money was the marked money

from the controlled purchase that had been made just prior to
execution of the search warrant.
THE COURT:

Would you agree that that would be the

State's evidence at trial?
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Yes.

He dis —

he obviously

disagrees with those and we 1 11 address those more at
sentencing, but we agree that that's what they'd present at
trial.
THE COURT:

All right.

How do you plead then to the

amended charge of a second degree felony, distribution of
controlled substance?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Guilty.

I'll accept the plea, find it's

knowingly and voluntarily entered.

The State's offered

sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of
conviction in the case.
Sentencing would be August
PROBATION OFFICER:

—

21st.
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THE COURT:

August 21st at two o'clock.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Okay?

Thank you.

Yeah.

The other two charges will be

dismissed.
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Your Honor, I —

I'm going to be out

of town on the 21st.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

Why don't we go to the 28th.

That would work.

Yeah.

(Proceedings conclude.)
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

State of Utah versus Davy Valenciano,

61904066.
Let me just first say that I realize that there's
been a motion to withdraw the plea, but the State has
responded to it already.

I took it upon myself simply to go

ahead and review the tape that I —
that I had taken.

of the —

of the plea

I've reviewed the State's response.

I've

reviewed what was filed, and I'm prepared to go ahead and
just handle that today.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
MR. LYON:
THE COURT:
realize you —
Mr. Valenciano.

Okay.

Okay.
Is there any argument on that motion?

I

that you filed it, Mr. Bouwhuis, on behalf of
The State has responded, and I'm not sure

anything else is going to be, you know, particularly helpful
but

—
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Right.

And I talked to

Mr. Valenciano about it, and he —

the only thing he had to

say in addition was just to expound on a couple of the
evidentiary problems, but that —
THE COURT:
it's

that doesn't change

—

If you want to do that, that's fine, but

—
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Well, he just indicated that there

was an item of evidence regarding which room he was found in

2

and which room he was supposed to have come from.

He

indicates there's a contradiction in the reports on that and
also indicates the receipt supposedly showing that he had
rented the room they thought he was in didn't have his
signature on it.

And so those were evidentiary issues that

he felt should have been attacked.
THE COURT:
MR. LYON:

Anything from the State?
We'll submit it on the brief.

THE COURT:

Okay.

The brief was filed by the State.

I think that properly states the current status of the law,
that if the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered and
there were no Rule 11 violations, there's no basis for
withdrawing the plea.
I'm going to deny your motion to withdraw the plea.
I was particularly interested in reviewing the tape to make
sure that everything had been done properly.

And not only

did you read the statement in support of the guilty plea, you
acknowledged that you read and understood it, you —

you —

also went through in great detail what your rights were in
addition to what was stated in the —

in the statement in

support of a guilty plea which had been read to you by
Mr. Bouwhuis.
I indicated to you that you could file a motion to
withdraw your plea but it was highly unlikely that I was
going to grant it if you entered a plea of guilty that day

3

I

because I felt that after we had gone through it, I had
answered all your questions, you had had an ample opportunity
to make a decision about whether you wanted to do this.

I

specifically stated to you are you sure this is what you, in
fact, want to do.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Your Honor

—

You said that you did, and I'm going to

deny your motion to withdraw the plea.
voluntarily.

It was clearly done

You knew what you were doing.

I'm convinced of

that, and I'm not going to let you withdraw it, just as I
indicated I wasn't going to absent some showing that we had
done something wrong at that time.
I don't think I could have done any more in terms of
taking the plea in terms of informing you what your rights
were, gave —

giving you ample opportunity to change your

mind if you wanted to do that.

I was certain after talking

with you at that date that that's, in fact, what you chose to
do.

You voluntarily entered your plea.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

—

Can I say something?

Well, I'm —

attorney speak for you.

And

you've just had your

I've reviewed the motion.

I'm going

to deny your motion, and I'm ready to go ahead with
sentencing, and I —

you know, I realize you may have

something to say with regard to sentencing, but that's fine.
You can say that.

But as far as withdrawing your plea, I'm
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not going to allow you to do that.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
got a

I

—
THE COURT:

to give a

with

I didn't get a presentence report.

There wasn't one done because he refused

—

MR. BOUWHUIS:

Okay.

THE COURT:

statement.

—

So I'm ready to go ahead

—
THE DEFENDANT:

Honor.

I didn't refuse anything, Your

I just told them I wasn't —

I had changed my plea

and I (inaudible) speak to my attorney.
THE COURT:

Right.

THE DEFENDANT:
did anything.

I wanted to speak to him before I

I didn't deny anything, and I —

case has been messed up.
that.

I was under drugs.

this whole
I was under all

You can see by the picture the way I look now compared

to when I've got my head on straight.
that day and everything.
made my decision.

I wasn't in my right mind when I

You can see

THE COURT:

I know what went on

—

That's not what you stated in your

motion to withdraw your plea, and I specifically asked you at
the time I took your plea all those questions.
going to go back

So we're not

—

THE DEFENDANT:
that's what happened.

I sent you a letter saying I

—

I sent you personally saying I
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wasn't —

I was under a lot of stress.

Personally I sent you

a letter when I got incarcerated.
THE COURT:
plea.

I f m not going to let you withdraw your

This case has been going on and

—

THE DEFENDANT:

Yeah, but it's not my fault

THE COURT:

No

—

THE DEFENDANT:

—

THE COURT:

—

THE DEFENDANT:

—

it's been going on.

just a minute.
It's not just me making judgments

and setting court dates.
THE COURT:

Let's go ahead —

ahead with sentencing today.

I'm willing to go

I'm not sure a presentence

report is going to be all that helpful anyway, given the
facts of this case and given the charge and given the
defendant's guilty plea to it.
So, Mr. Bouwhuis, do you want to go ahead with
anything?
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Well, I guess the challenge I have is

I don't have a presentence report.
record is.

I don't know what his

I don't know the standard things that we would

have with a presentence report regarding his background,
employment, the family, substance abuse history, and whatnot,
so I'm not really prepared on this.
MR. LYON:
discretion.

We'll leave it to Your Honor's

The State's —

I've had a chance to briefly
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review his criminal record.

I think it's a prison -- I think

it should be a prison recommendation, but we'll leave it to
Your Honor's discretion.
THE COURT:

Well, you know, I suppose to avoid any

problem in the future I'll get a presentence report.

I'm not

sure it's going to be helpful because, frankly, dealing drugs
is a prison offense as far as I'm concerned
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

—

Your Honor

—

—

especially in a case like this.

get a presentence report.

That's the end of that.

I'll

Okay?

I'm reluctant to do it, but I'll do it because I don't want
any criticism later on so

—

PROBATION OFFICER:
THE COURT:

October 9th, Your Honor.

October 9th at 2:00 o'clock you'll be

sentenced on this charge.
THE BAILIFF:

Let's go.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE BAILIFF:

Speak to him?
Nope.

MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

Let's go.

Thank you, Your Honor.

Thank you.

(End of proceedings.)
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